前言
比较古老的问题,记录下之前分析的过程。
漏洞描述
AccountManager LaunchAnyWhere漏洞就不解释了,直接看checkKeyIntent
/**
* Checks Intents, supplied via KEY_INTENT, to make sure that they don't violate our
* security policy.
*
* In particular we want to make sure that the Authenticator doesn't try to trick users
* into launching arbitrary intents on the device via by tricking to click authenticator
* supplied entries in the system Settings app.
*/
protected boolean checkKeyIntent(int authUid, Intent intent) {
intent.setFlags(intent.getFlags() & ~(Intent.FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION
| Intent.FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION
| Intent.FLAG_GRANT_PERSISTABLE_URI_PERMISSION
| Intent.FLAG_GRANT_PREFIX_URI_PERMISSION));
long bid = Binder.clearCallingIdentity();
try {
PackageManager pm = mContext.getPackageManager();
ResolveInfo resolveInfo = pm.resolveActivityAsUser(intent, 0, mAccounts.userId);
if (resolveInfo == null) {
return false;
}
ActivityInfo targetActivityInfo = resolveInfo.activityInfo;
int targetUid = targetActivityInfo.applicationInfo.uid;
PackageManagerInternal pmi = LocalServices.getService(PackageManagerInternal.class);
if (!isExportedSystemActivity(targetActivityInfo)
&& !pmi.hasSignatureCapability(
targetUid, authUid,
PackageParser.SigningDetails.CertCapabilities.AUTH)) {
String pkgName = targetActivityInfo.packageName;
String activityName = targetActivityInfo.name;
String tmpl = "KEY_INTENT resolved to an Activity (%s) in a package (%s) that "
+ "does not share a signature with the supplying authenticator (%s).";
Log.e(TAG, String.format(tmpl, activityName, pkgName, mAccountType));
return false;
}
return true;
} finally {
Binder.restoreCallingIdentity(bid);
}
}
这里面删除了和URI grant相关的四个flag,但是阅读Intent的源代码发现,如果使用一些特殊的Action,又会在startActivity
流程中把flag加回来。关键点在Instrumentation
里面调用的migrateExtraStreamToClipData
方法
/**
* Execute a startActivity call made by the application. The default
* implementation takes care of updating any active {@link ActivityMonitor}
* objects and dispatches this call to the system activity manager; you can
* override this to watch for the application to start an activity, and
* modify what happens when it does.
*
* <p>This method returns an {@link ActivityResult} object, which you can
* use when intercepting application calls to avoid performing the start
* activity action but still return the result the application is
* expecting. To do this, override this method to catch the call to start
* activity so that it returns a new ActivityResult containing the results
* you would like the application to see, and don't call up to the super
* class. Note that an application is only expecting a result if
* <var>requestCode</var> is >= 0.
*
* <p>This method throws {@link android.content.ActivityNotFoundException}
* if there was no Activity found to run the given Intent.
*
* @param who The Context from which the activity is being started.
* @param contextThread The main thread of the Context from which the activity
* is being started.
* @param token Internal token identifying to the system who is starting
* the activity; may be null.
* @param target Which activity is performing the start (and thus receiving
* any result); may be null if this call is not being made
* from an activity.
* @param intent The actual Intent to start.
* @param requestCode Identifier for this request's result; less than zero
* if the caller is not expecting a result.
* @param options Addition options.
*
* @return To force the return of a particular result, return an
* ActivityResult object containing the desired data; otherwise
* return null. The default implementation always returns null.
*
* @throws android.content.ActivityNotFoundException
*
* @see Activity#startActivity(Intent)
* @see Activity#startActivityForResult(Intent, int)
* @see Activity#startActivityFromChild
*
* {@hide}
*/
@UnsupportedAppUsage
public ActivityResult execStartActivity(
Context who, IBinder contextThread, IBinder token, Activity target,
Intent intent, int requestCode, Bundle options) {
IApplicationThread whoThread = (IApplicationThread) contextThread;
Uri referrer = target != null ? target.onProvideReferrer() : null;
if (referrer != null) {
intent.putExtra(Intent.EXTRA_REFERRER, referrer);
}
if (mActivityMonitors != null) {
synchronized (mSync) {
final int N = mActivityMonitors.size();
for (int i=0; i<N; i++) {
final ActivityMonitor am = mActivityMonitors.get(i);
ActivityResult result = null;
if (am.ignoreMatchingSpecificIntents()) {
result = am.onStartActivity(intent);
}
if (result != null) {
am.mHits++;
return result;
} else if (am.match(who, null, intent)) {
am.mHits++;
if (am.isBlocking()) {
return requestCode >= 0 ? am.getResult() : null;
}
break;
}
}
}
}
try {
intent.migrateExtraStreamToClipData();
intent.prepareToLeaveProcess(who);
int result = ActivityTaskManager.getService()
.startActivity(whoThread, who.getBasePackageName(), intent,
intent.resolveTypeIfNeeded(who.getContentResolver()),
token, target != null ? target.mEmbeddedID : null,
requestCode, 0, null, options);
checkStartActivityResult(result, intent);
} catch (RemoteException e) {
throw new RuntimeException("Failure from system", e);
}
return null;
}
这里面调用了migrateExtraStreamToClipData
方法,这个方法的处理就很有意思。
/**
* Migrate any {@link #EXTRA_STREAM} in {@link #ACTION_SEND} and
* {@link #ACTION_SEND_MULTIPLE} to {@link ClipData}. Also inspects nested
* intents in {@link #ACTION_CHOOSER}.
*
* @return Whether any contents were migrated.
* @hide
*/
public boolean migrateExtraStreamToClipData() {
// Refuse to touch if extras already parcelled
if (mExtras != null && mExtras.isParcelled()) return false;
// Bail when someone already gave us ClipData
if (getClipData() != null) return false;
final String action = getAction();
if (ACTION_CHOOSER.equals(action)) {
// Inspect contained intents to see if we need to migrate extras. We
// don't promote ClipData to the parent, since ChooserActivity will
// already start the picked item as the caller, and we can't combine
// the flags in a safe way.
boolean migrated = false;
try {
final Intent intent = getParcelableExtra(EXTRA_INTENT);
if (intent != null) {
migrated |= intent.migrateExtraStreamToClipData();
}
} catch (ClassCastException e) {
}
try {
final Parcelable[] intents = getParcelableArrayExtra(EXTRA_INITIAL_INTENTS);
if (intents != null) {
for (int i = 0; i < intents.length; i++) {
final Intent intent = (Intent) intents[i];
if (intent != null) {
migrated |= intent.migrateExtraStreamToClipData();
}
}
}
} catch (ClassCastException e) {
}
return migrated;
} else if (ACTION_SEND.equals(action)) {
try {
final Uri stream = getParcelableExtra(EXTRA_STREAM);
final CharSequence text = getCharSequenceExtra(EXTRA_TEXT);
final String htmlText = getStringExtra(EXTRA_HTML_TEXT);
if (stream != null || text != null || htmlText != null) {
final ClipData clipData = new ClipData(
null, new String[] { getType() },
new ClipData.Item(text, htmlText, null, stream));
setClipData(clipData);
addFlags(FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION);
return true;
}
} catch (ClassCastException e) {
}
} else if (ACTION_SEND_MULTIPLE.equals(action)) {
try {
final ArrayList<Uri> streams = getParcelableArrayListExtra(EXTRA_STREAM);
final ArrayList<CharSequence> texts = getCharSequenceArrayListExtra(EXTRA_TEXT);
final ArrayList<String> htmlTexts = getStringArrayListExtra(EXTRA_HTML_TEXT);
int num = -1;
if (streams != null) {
num = streams.size();
}
if (texts != null) {
if (num >= 0 && num != texts.size()) {
// Wha...! F- you.
return false;
}
num = texts.size();
}
if (htmlTexts != null) {
if (num >= 0 && num != htmlTexts.size()) {
// Wha...! F- you.
return false;
}
num = htmlTexts.size();
}
if (num > 0) {
final ClipData clipData = new ClipData(
null, new String[] { getType() },
makeClipItem(streams, texts, htmlTexts, 0));
for (int i = 1; i < num; i++) {
clipData.addItem(makeClipItem(streams, texts, htmlTexts, i));
}
setClipData(clipData);
addFlags(FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION);
return true;
}
} catch (ClassCastException e) {
}
} else if (MediaStore.ACTION_IMAGE_CAPTURE.equals(action)
|| MediaStore.ACTION_IMAGE_CAPTURE_SECURE.equals(action)
|| MediaStore.ACTION_VIDEO_CAPTURE.equals(action)) {
final Uri output;
try {
output = getParcelableExtra(MediaStore.EXTRA_OUTPUT);
} catch (ClassCastException e) {
return false;
}
if (output != null) {
setClipData(ClipData.newRawUri("", output));
addFlags(FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION|FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION);
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
这里面对于下列action,会从特定的extra中取出URI,并且放入CilpData字段,然后自动加上相关flag,具体逻辑可以看代码,这里面我们就使用MediaStore.ACTION_IMAGE_CAPTURE
这个action,可以绕过AccountManager的补丁再次获取读写权限。
Intent intent = new Intent();
intent.setClassName("com.wrlus.poc.extragrant",
"com.wrlus.poc.extragrant.ExpActivity");
intent.setAction(MediaStore.ACTION_IMAGE_CAPTURE);
intent.putExtra(MediaStore.EXTRA_OUTPUT,
Uri.parse("content://com.huawei.searchservice.fileprovider/root/data/system/packages.xml"));
这里面我们并不需要加flag,因为即使加了也会被checkKeyIntent
给删掉,我们就等着migrateExtraStreamToClipData
方法自动给我们加就好了。配合一些URI allowlist的问题,即可在不使用Bundle mismatch的情况下绕过补丁成功利用漏洞。
修复
/**
* Checks Intents, supplied via KEY_INTENT, to make sure that they don't violate our
* security policy.
*
* In particular we want to make sure that the Authenticator doesn't try to trick users
* into launching arbitrary intents on the device via by tricking to click authenticator
* supplied entries in the system Settings app.
*/
protected boolean checkKeyIntent(int authUid, Intent intent) {
// Explicitly set an empty ClipData to ensure that we don't offer to
// promote any Uris contained inside for granting purposes
if (intent.getClipData() == null) {
intent.setClipData(ClipData.newPlainText(null, null));
}
intent.setFlags(intent.getFlags() & ~(Intent.FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION
| Intent.FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION
| Intent.FLAG_GRANT_PERSISTABLE_URI_PERMISSION
| Intent.FLAG_GRANT_PREFIX_URI_PERMISSION));
long bid = Binder.clearCallingIdentity();
try {
PackageManager pm = mContext.getPackageManager();
ResolveInfo resolveInfo = pm.resolveActivityAsUser(intent, 0, mAccounts.userId);
if (resolveInfo == null) {
return false;
}
ActivityInfo targetActivityInfo = resolveInfo.activityInfo;
int targetUid = targetActivityInfo.applicationInfo.uid;
PackageManagerInternal pmi = LocalServices.getService(PackageManagerInternal.class);
if (!isExportedSystemActivity(targetActivityInfo)
&& !pmi.hasSignatureCapability(
targetUid, authUid,
PackageParser.SigningDetails.CertCapabilities.AUTH)) {
String pkgName = targetActivityInfo.packageName;
String activityName = targetActivityInfo.name;
String tmpl = "KEY_INTENT resolved to an Activity (%s) in a package (%s) that "
+ "does not share a signature with the supplying authenticator (%s).";
Log.e(TAG, String.format(tmpl, activityName, pkgName, mAccountType));
return false;
}
return true;
} finally {
Binder.restoreCallingIdentity(bid);
}
}
如果getClipData为null则手动设置一个ClipData,虽然也是没有东西但是会破坏migrateExtraStreamToClipData
中getClipData() != null
的条件,就没有这个问题了。
小路老师你好,我是安卓框架层漏洞挖掘爱好者,有没有更多的类似本文的cve详细分析文章,网上这种资源好难找。现在好像遇到瓶颈了,挖掘思路枯竭。有的话可否麻烦你分享一下,万分感谢。
感觉只能是Google搜索一些CVE来看看,这方面的资料确实不多。:)